LE DERNIER SCREAM

ONE SIMPLY MUST HAVE LONG LINES AND—SLUMP.

MR. ROOSEVELT ON "ROUGH RIDERS" AND OTHER THEMES OF '98

Continued from third page.

minded, and he promised to do as I wished. True to his word, he secured the appointment of Wood as colonel and of myself as lieutenant colonel of the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry. This was soon nicknamed, both by the public and by the rest of the army, the Rough Riders, doubtless because the bulk of the men were from the Southwestern ranch country and were skilled in the wild horsemanship of the great plains.

RAISING THE REGIMENT.

Wood instantly began the work of raising the regiment. He first assembled several old non-commissioned officers of experience, put them in office and gave them blanks for requisitions for the full equipment of a cavalry regiment. He selected San Antonio as the gathering place, as it was in a good horse country, near the Gulf, from some port on which we would have to embark, and near an old arsenal and an old army post from which we got a good deal of stuff—some of it practically condemned, but which we found serviceable at a pinch and much better than nothing. He organized a horse board in Texas and began purchasing all horses that were not too big and were sound. A day or two after he was commissioned he wrote out in the office of the Secretary of War, under his authority, telegrams to the Governors of Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Indian Territory, in substance as follows:

The President desires to raise —— volunteers in your territory to form part of a regiment of mounted riflemen to be commanded by Leonard Wood, colonel; Theodore Roosevelt, lieutenant colonel. He desires that the men selected should be young, sound, good shots and good riders and that you expedite by all means in your power the enrolment of these men. (Signed) R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

As soon as he had attended to a few more odds and ends he left Washington, and the day after his arrival in San Antonio the troops began to arrive.

THE VALUE OF BLACK TOP BOOTS

For several weeks before I joined the regiment, to which Wood went ahead of me, I continued as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, trying to get some coherence of plan between the War Department and the Navy Department, and also being used by Wood to finish getting the equipment for the regiment. As regards finding out what the plans of the War Department were the task was simple. They had no plans. Even during the final months before the outbreak of hostilities very little was done in the way of efficient preparation. On one occasion, when every one knew that the declaration of war was sure to come in a few days, I went on military business to the office of one of the highest line generals of the army, a man who at that moment ought to have been working eighteen hours out of the twenty-four on the vital problems ahead of him. What he was actually doing was trying on a new type of smart-looking uniform on certain enlisted men, and he called me in to ask my advice as to the position of the pockets in the blouse, with a view to making it look attractive. An aid of this general—funnily enough a good fighting man in actual service—when I consulted him as to what my uniform for the campaign should be, laid special stress upon my purchasing a pair of black top boots for full dress, explaining that they were very effective on hotel piazzas and in parlors. I did not intend to be in any hotel if it could possibly be avoided, and as things turned out I had no full dress uniform, nothing but my service uniform, during my brief experience in the army.

MERCENARY PATRIOTISM.

I suppose that war always does bring out what is highest and lowest in human nature. The contractors who furnish poor materials to the army or the navy in time of war stand on a level of infamy only one degree above that of participants in the "white slave" traffic themselves. But there is conduct far short of this which yet seems inexplicable to any man who has in him any spirit of disinterested patriotism combined with any power of imagination. Respectable men, who I suppose lack the imagination thoroughly to realize what they are doing, try to make money out of the nation's necessities in war at the very time that other men are making every sacrifice, financial and personal, for the cause. In the closing weeks of my service as Assistant Secretary of the Navy we were collecting ships for auxiliary purposes. Some men, at cost to their own purses, helped us freely and with efficiency; others treated the affair as an ordinary business transaction; and yet others endeavored, at some given crisis when our need was great, to sell us inferior vessels at exhorbitant prices and used every pressure, through Senators and Congressmen, to accomplish their ends. In one or two cases they did accomplish them, too, until we got a really first class board established to superintend such purchases. A more curious experience was in connection with the point chosen for the starting for the expedition against Cuba. I had not supposed that any human being could consider this matter save from the standpoint of military need. But one morning a very wealthy and influential man, a respectable and upright man according to his own lights, called on me to protest against our choice of Tampa and to put in a plea for a certain other port *on the ground that his railroad was entitled to its share of the profit for hauling the army and equipment.* I happened to know that at this time this very man had kinsfolk with the army, who served gallantly, and the circumstances of his coming to me were such as to show that he was not acting secretly and had no idea that there was anything out of the way in his proposal. I think the facts were merely that he had been trained to regard business as the sole object of life and that he lacked the imagination to enable him to understand the real nature of the request that he was making; and, moreover, he had good reason to believe that one of his business competitors had been unduly favored.

ARMY STAGNATION.

The War Department was in far worse shape than the Navy Department. The young officers turned out from West Point are precisely as good as the young officers turned out from Annapolis, and this always has been true. But at that time (something has been done to remedy the worst conditions since) and ever since the close of the Civil War the conditions were such that after a few years the army officer stagnated, so far as his profession was concerned. When the Spanish war broke out the navy really was largely on a war footing, as any navy which is even respectably cared for in time of peace must be. The admirals, captains and lieutenants were continually practising their profession in almost precisely the way that it has to be practised in time of war. Except actually shooting at a foe, most of the men on board ship went through in time of peace practically all that they would have to go through in time of war. The heads of bureaus in the Navy Department were for the most part men who had seen sea service, who expected to return to sea service, and who were preparing for needs which they themselves knew by experience. Moreover, the civilian head of the navy had to provide for keeping the ships in a state of reasonable efficiency, and Congress could not hopelessly misbehave itself about the navy without the fact at once becoming evident.

HOW TO SHAVE A MULE'S TAIL.

All this was changed so far as the army was concerned. Not only was it possible to decrease the efficiency of the army without being called to account for it, but the only way in which the Secretary of War could gain credit for himself or the administration was by economy, and the easiest way to economize was in connection with something that would not be felt unless war should arise. The people took no interest whatever in the army; demagogues clamored against it, and, inadequate though it was in size, insisted that it should be still further reduced. Popular orators always appealed to the volunteers; the regulars had no votes, and there was no point in politicians thinking of them. The chief activity shown by Congressmen about the army was in getting special army posts built in places where there was no need for them. Even the work of the army in its campaigns against the Indians was of such a character that it was generally performed by small bodies of fifty or a hundred men. Until a man ceased being a lieutenant he usually had plenty of professional work to attend to and was employed in the field, and, in short, had the same kind of practice that his brother in the navy had and he did his work as well. But once past this stage he had almost no opportunity to perform any work corresponding to his rank, and but little opportunity to do any military work whatsoever. The very best men, men like Lawton, Young, Chaffee, Hawkins and Sumner, to mention only men under or beside whom I served, remained good soldiers, soldiers of the best stamp, in spite of the disheartening conditions. But it was not to be expected that the average man could continue to grow when every influence was against him. Accordingly, when the Spanish war suddenly burst upon us, a number of inert elderly captains and field officers were, much against their own wishes, suddenly pitchforked into the command of regiments, brigades, and even divisions and army corps. Often these men failed painfully. This was not their fault; it was the fault of the nation; that is, the fault of all of us, of you, my reader, and of myself, and of those like us, because we had permitted conditions to be such as to render these men unfit for command. Take a stout captain of an out-of-the-way two-company post, where nothing in the world ever occurred even resembling military action, and where the only military problem that really convulsed the post to its foundations was the quarrel between the captain and the quartermaster as to how high a mule's tail ought to be shaved (I am speaking of an actual incident). What could be expected of such a man, even though thirty-five years before he had been a gallant second lieutenant in the Civil War, if, after this intervening do-nothing period, he was suddenly put in command of raw troops in a midsummer campaign in the tropics?

INCOMPETENCY AND WAR.

The bureau chiefs were for the most part elderly incompetents, whose idea was to do their routine duties in such way as to escape the censure of routine bureaucratic superiors and to avoid a Congressional investigation. They had not the slightest conception of preparing the army for war. It was impossible that they could have any such conception. The people and the Congress did not wish the army prepared for war, and those editors and philanthropists and peace advocates who felt vaguely that if the army were incompetent their principles were safe, always inveighed against any proposal to make it efficient, on the ground that this showed a natural bloodthirstiness in the proposer. When such were the conditions, it was absolutely impossible that either the War Department or the army could do well in the event of war. Secretary Alger happened to be Secretary when war broke out, and all the responsibility for the shortcomings of the department was visited upon his devoted head. He was made the scapegoat for our national shortcomings. The fault was not his; the fault and responsibility lay with us, the people, who for thirty-three years had permitted our representatives in Congress and in national executive office to bear themselves so that it was absolutely impossible to avoid the great bulk of all the trouble that occurred, and of all the shortcomings of which our people complained, during the Spanish War. The chief immediate cause was the condition of red tape bureaucracy which existed in the War Department at Washington, which had prevented any good organization or the preparation of any good plan of operation, for using our men and supplies. The recurrence of these conditions, even though in somewhat less aggravated form, in any future emergency is as certain as sunrise unless we bring about the principle of a four years' detail in the staff corps—a principle which Congress has now for years stubbornly refused to grant.

THE LESSON OF NOGI.

There are nations which need only to have peaceful ideals inculcated, and to whom militarism is a curse and a misfortune. There are other nations, like our own, so happily situated that the thought of war is never present to their minds. They are wholly free from any tendency improperly to exalt or to practise militarism. These nations should never forget that there must be military ideals no less than peaceful ideals. The exaltation of Nogi's career, set forth so strikingly in Stanley Washburn's little volume on the great Japanese warrior, contains much that is especially needed for us of America, prone as we are to regard the exigencies of a purely commercial and industrial civilization as excusing us from the need of admiring and practising the heroic and warlike virtues.

Our people are not military. We need normally only a small standing army; but there should be behind it a reserve of instructed men big enough to fill it up to full war strength, which is over twice the peace strength. Moreover, the young men of the country should realize that it is the duty of every one of them to prepare himself so that in time of need he may speedily become an efficient soldier—a duty now generally forgotten, but which should be recognized as one of the vitally essential parts of every man's training.

LARIAT AND BLACK POWDER.

In endeavoring to get the "Rough Riders" equipped I met with some experiences which were both odd and instructive. There were not enough arms and other necessaries to go round, and there was keen rivalry among the intelligent and zealous commanders of the volunteer organizations as to who should get first choice. Wood's experience was what enabled us to equip ourselves in short order. There was another cavalry organization whose commander was at the War Department about this time, and we had been eying him with much alertness as a rival. One day I asked him what his plans were about arming and drilling his troops, who were of precisely the type of our own men. He answered that he expected "to give each of the boys two revolvers and a lariat, and then just turn them loose." I reported the conversation to Wood, with the remark that we might feel ourselves safe from rivalry in that quarter; and safe we were.

In trying to get the equipment I met with checks and rebuffs, and in return was the cause of worry and concern to various bureau chiefs, who were unquestionably estimable men in their private and domestic relations, and who doubtless had been good officers thirty years before, but who were as unfit for modern war as if they were so many smooth-bores. One fine old fellow did his best to persuade us to take black powder rifles, explaining with paternal indulgence that no one yet really knew just what smokeless powder might do, and that there was a good deal to be said in favor of having smoke to conceal us from the enemy. I saw this pleasing theory actually worked out in practice later on, for the national guard regiments with us at Santiago had black powder muskets and the regular artillery black powder guns, and they really might almost as well have replaced these weapons by crossbows and mangonels. We succeeded, thanks to Wood, in getting the same cavalry carbines that were used by the regulars. We were determined to do this, not only because the weapons were good, but because this would, in all probability, mean that we should be brigaded with the regular cavalry, which it was certain would be sent immediately to the front for the fighting.

BUREAUCRACY AND RED TAPE.

There was one worthy bureau chief who was continually refusing applications of mine as irregular. In each case I would appeal to Secretary Alger—who helped me in every way—and get an order from him countenancing the irregularity. For instance, I found out that as we were nearer the July date than the January date for the issuance of clothing, and as it had long been customary to issue the winter clothing in July, so as to give ample leisure for getting it to all the various posts, it was therefore solemnly proposed to issue this same winter clothing to us who were about to start for a summer campaign in the tropics. This would seem incredible to those who have never dealt with an inert officialdom, a red tape bureaucracy, but such is the fact. I rectified this and got an order for khaki clothing. We were then told we would have to advertise thirty days for horses. This meant that we would have missed the Santiago expedition. So I made another successful appeal to the Secretary. Other difficulties came up about wagons and various articles, and in each case the same result followed. On the last occasion, when I came up in triumph with the needed order, the worried office head, who bore me no animosity but who did feel that fate had been very unkind, threw himself back in his chair and exclaimed with a sigh: "Oh, dear! I had this office running in such good shape—and then along came the war and upset everything!" His feeling was that war was an illegitimate interruption to the work of the War Department.

There were, of course, department heads and bureau chiefs and assistants who, in spite of the worthlessness of the system and of the paralyzing conditions that had prevailed, remained first class men. An example of these was Commissary General Weston. His energy, activity, administrative efficiency and common sense were supplemented by an eager desire to help everybody do the best that could be done. Both in Washington and again down at Santiago we owed him very much. When I was President it was my good fortune to repay him in part our debt, which means the debt of the people of the country, by making him a major general.

The next instalment of Mr. Roosevelt's "Chapters of a Possible Autobiography" is entitled "The Rough Riders in Cuba." It will appear in the issue of September 28.

THE SUN'S RAYS IN HARNESS

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movement which swings them into proper line.

Mr. Shuman's problem was a many-sided one. It was not enough that he should catch the sun's rays and cause them to produce steam within a novel type of boiler, but it was necessary that he should develop an engine capable of using the steam of modest pressure which he thus obtained. Therefore, he set himself to the designing of a special type of low pressure reciprocating engine of exceptional steam economy. Of course, we are not going to describe this engine, because we are not bent upon studying the subject in its technical details. It is enough for us to know that Mr. Shuman succeeded, and he is the authority for the statement that his Egyptian plant has proved so efficient that water can be pumped by it for less than one-third what the same service would cost if coal were burned. This unquestionably is a very noteworthy achievement, and one that means more than most of us realize.

In the tropics, and in some arid sections of our own country and other very dry places elsewhere, the cost of fuel is extremely high, reaching in some cases as much as $30 a ton. Therefore, where there is no other natural source of energy available the utilization of the sun's heat becomes vitally important. We have all learned what irrigation of some of our own arid lands will do in the way of turning these profitless wastes into fertile fields of abundance, and it is in these very regions that Nature has placed at our disposal a wealth of annual sunshine and an atmosphere unclouded or undimmed by haze, which might otherwise sap or dissipate the heat of the rays in transit.

But don't be misled into believing that a sun-power plant per se is an inexpensive installation, and don't think simply because Old Sol's radiance is doing the work that you have the equivalent of perpetual motion and no outlays thereafter. Mr. Shuman, fortunately, while an inventor, is both hard headed and practical, and he makes the following direct comparison between a coal burning plant and a sun heat plant of equivalent powers, each running eight hours daily. According to his figures we have the accompanying essential expense items:

Annual cost of operating 100-horsepower sun plant, the initial cost of which being $20,000:

Interest on cost at 5 per cent	$1,000
Depreciation of plant at 5 per cent	1,000
One engineer at $5 a day, 350 days	1,750
Total	$3,750

Annual cost of operating 100-horsepower coal burning plant, the initial cost of which being $10,000:

Interest on cost at 5 per cent	$500
Depreciation of plant at 5 per cent	500
One engineer at $5 a day, 350 days	1,750
Total	$2,750

From the foregoing figures it is clear that the sun power plant would cost $1,000 more a year in interest on investment and wear and tear than the coal burning plant, but this is without considering fuel consumption at all. Where, as it does in the tropics and some other places inaccessible by rail, coal costs anywhere from $5 up to $30 a ton, and with a fair average of something like $15 a ton in many of these places, where the use of water is necessary in order to take advantage of Nature's bounty in other ways, the economy of a sun power plant becomes very evident.

Right here within our own confines—that is to say, in Arizona, New Mexico, Southern California and Nevada, where there is an average of 90 per cent of sunlight, but with fuel at an extravagant figure—an installation like that which Mr. Shuman has built in Egypt would be of the utmost value in providing water for irrigation. But irrigation is not the only useful purpose to which water can be put. The borax industry in Death Valley is very much hampered by a dearth of water, and in that region there is plenty of sunshine, combined with an average atmospheric temperature which ranges from 100 up to 140 degrees Fahrenheit. This temperature tells something of the heat of the sun's rays as they fall upon the earth without concentration. With concentration, as his system provides, it would be an easy matter to maintain an ample supply of steam at the required working pressure for his pumping engine.

We have every reason, therefore, to be interested in what this ingenious Philadelphian has been doing at Meadi, and his work is only a pioneer effort toward the conservation of the sun's energy, which now goes so largely to waste in the arid and desert lands.

Charles Frohman has no great admiration for the actor-manager, and at a recent luncheon at the Players, in Gramercy Park, he said:

"After all, what is an actor-manager? Isn't he just a chap who can manage without acting?"